Who Gets to Shape the Future of Soccer?

In late September 2026, FIFA President Gianni Infantino said, “This is not about generating positive headlines; it is about doing what is right for the game. And I have never been more determined and committed in doing that.”

This statement follows FIFA’s July proposal to create a $20 billion company to manage the World Cup and other FIFA competitions. Under the proposal, private investors could purchase up to a 20% stake in FIFA’s commercial rights, including the World Cup. FIFA said the proposal would generate nearly $4.2 billion for global soccer development.

The proposal immediately drew backlash from the Union of European Football Associations, a continental soccer organization representing 55 national associations. UEFA argued that FIFA was treating the World Cup as an investment product and criticized the project for not consulting soccer stakeholders and member associations during its development.

Three days later, on July 31, FIFA withdrew its plan. Infantino said the project had “created divisions of a nature that, regardless of the level of support, are no longer in the interest of the objective set out in the first place.”

The episode was brief, but it brought a long-standing disagreement within international soccer into the public eye.

The Backdrop

FIFA governs the global game and represents 211 national associations. UEFA governs European soccer, including the Champions League and the continent’s national-team competitions. The two organizations compete for influence over some of the same players, clubs, and commercial markets. It thus makes sense that tensions escalated with Infantino’s proposal to extract additional commercial value from FIFA’s competitions.

Since assuming the FIFA presidency in 2016, Infantino has pushed the organization toward larger competitions, greater commercial revenue, and a broader role in global soccer outside of Europe. UEFA, whose league and clubs still generate most of the sport’s commercial value, is challenging both the scale of FIFA’s expansion and how Infantino is pursuing it.

Infantino is no stranger to European soccer: before joining FIFA, he worked at UEFA from 2000 to 2016, rising through the ranks to become general secretary. After FIFA’s previous president, Sepp Blatter, resigned amid a corruption crisis, Infantino was elected as Blatter’s replacement. In his campaign, Infantino pledged governance reform; he has since introduced measures including presidential term limits and greater financial oversight at FIFA.

The organization has vastly expanded during Infantino’s presidency. FIFA expects revenue for the 2023–26 cycle to exceed $15 billion, more than double the organization’s revenue during the previous cycle. This growth has allowed FIFA to increase the money it distributes to its member associations. For instance, during the 2026 World Cup, FIFA allocated $871 million to the 48 participating teams, a 20% increase over the previously approved $727 million.

This approach has extended to FIFA’s development programs. Infantino argues for leveraging World Cup profits to provide resources to countries whose soccer systems do not benefit from the wealth of Europe’s competitions and clubs—which also helps explain why the organization has continued pursuing larger international competitions.

FIFA’s mission of expansion seemed to be realized in 2026, when the World Cup featured 48 teams, up from 32 in 2022. FIFA has also introduced a 32-team Club World Cup in 2025, replacing a seven-team event with a month-long tournament in the United States. FIFA argued that the Club World Cup gives teams from Africa, Asia, and South America more opportunities to compete against Europe’s wealthiest teams.

However, European soccer leagues and FIFPRO Europe, which represents players across 34 national player unions in Europe, have raised concerns that additional matches could overwhelm an already crowded calendar.

The Proposal

The organization’s proposed Forward Enterprise would have consolidated the commercial rights and event operations of competitions including the World Cup and Club World Cup. Under the proposal, the company would remain under FIFA’s control while allowing private investors to purchase a minority stake.

FIFA said the structure would allow its 211 member associations to participate more directly in the commercial opportunities created by the sport’s global growth. It argued that additional investment could increase funding for soccer development.

UEFA objected to the proposal on both substantive and procedural grounds. UEFA’s 55 associations unanimously rejected the plan and threatened to withdraw from FIFA competitions if it went forward. The governing body argued that national teams and the public had built the World Cup and that it should not become an asset for private investors. FIFA withdrew the proposal before its member organizations could vote.

Still, the decision created a new governance problem for Infantino. European officials argued that if a plan of this scale could be developed without full consultation of FIFA’s continental confederations, the governance concerns extended beyond the plan itself. In response, in September, Infantino proposed an independent external review of FIFA’s governance for major strategic initiatives. The review would examine how the organization should consult fellow stakeholders and member associations before making major decisions.

Some European federations argue that the proposal does not go far enough. The German, Dutch, Swedish and Welsh associations have called for deeper governance changes, while German Football Association president Bernd Neuendorf described Infantino’s plan as an attempt to strengthen his position ahead of the 2027 election.

Looking Ahead

Further debates center on FIFA’s December 2024 decision to award the 2034 World Cup to Saudi Arabia, which will become the first nation to host the 48-team format on its own. UEFA, the Confederation of African Football, and the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol were ruled ineligible to host the World Cup in 2034, as each has a nation hosting in 2030. Critics have described the bidding process as a calculated manipulation of FIFA’s rotation rules designed to clear a path for Saudi Arabia’s bid to host the tournament, as the Asian and North American federations remained the only ones eligible to host.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have criticized FIFA’s assessment of Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, particularly its treatment of migrant workers and approach to labor protections. The former also argued that the assessment failed to adequately address documented risks involving forced labor, wage theft, and dangerous working conditions. FIFA has defended its bidding process and human rights requirements.

FIFA must now turn its attention to how it should govern its international growth. Infantino has spent the last decade building a larger FIFA. His decisions could shape the sport’s expansion, competitions, and rules for the next generation of soccer fans and players. The debate ultimately raises a larger question: who gets to shape the business and governance of the world’s most popular sport?

The governance debate comes as Infantino seeks a fourth term as FIFA president. He announced his candidacy during the FIFA congress in April and May, and FIFA said in July that 200 of its 211 members had pledged their support. The election is scheduled for March 2027.

Rohan Tyagi ’29 (rohantyagi@college.harvard.edu) will be checking in on FIFA’s next commercial proposal.